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Abstract
While regulators advocate for higher cloud trans-
parency, many Cloud Service Providers (CSPs)
often do not provide detailed information re-
garding their security implementations in their
Service Level Agreements (SLAs). In practice,
CSPs are hesitant to release detailed information
regarding their security posture for security and
proprietary reasons. This lack of transparency
hinders the adoption of cloud computing by en-
terprises and individuals. Unless CSPs share in-
formation regarding the technical details of their
security proceedings and standards, customers
cannot verify which cloud provider matched their
needs in terms of security and privacy guar-
antees. To address this problem, we propose
QRES, the first system that enables (a) CSPs to
disclose detailed information about their offered
security services in an encrypted form to ensure
data confidentiality, and (b) customers to assess
the CSPs’ offered security services and find those
satisfying their security requirements. Our sys-
tem preserves each party’s privacy by leveraging
a novel evaluation method based on Secure Two
Party Computation (2PC) and Searchable En-
cryption techniques. We implement QRES and
highlight its usefulness by applying it to existing
standardized SLAs. The real world tests illus-
trate that the system runs in acceptable time
for practical application even when used with a
multitude of CSPs. We formally prove the secu-
rity requirements of the proposed system against
a strong realistic adversarial model, using an au-
tomated cryptographic protocol verifier.
1 Introduction
Cloud computing allows customers to develop,
manage, and access a spectrum of resources
(storage, software, applications, etc.) which are
typically offered as-a-service in a remotely ac-
cessible fashion. In such a service-based envi-
ronment, the cloud provisioning relies on stip-
ulated Service Level Agreements (SLAs). Such
an agreement is basically a contract between the
Cloud Service Provider (CSP) and the customer
regarding the offered service. These SLAs spec-
ify the cloud service levels requested by the cus-
tomers, and required to be achieved by the CSPs.
A variety of parameters for different aspects of a
service can be included in the SLA, such as but
not limited to: availability, performance, down-
time and location of the data.
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Albeit the numerous claimed benefits of the
cloud to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the stored data, the number of se-
curity breaches is still on the rise [1,6]. The lack
of security assurance and transparency has pre-
vented customers and enterprises from trusting
the CSPs, and hence not using their services.
Unless the customers security requirements are
identified, documented, and communicated by
the CSPs, customers can not be assured that the
CSPs will satisfy their requirements.
In this context, a number of cloud commu-
nity stakeholders (e.g., ISO 27002 [25] and the
European Union Agency for Network and Infor-
mation Security (ENISA) [40]) are pushing to-
wards the inclusion of security parameters and
CSP’s security implementation in security SLAs
(named secSLAs [37]). Basically, secSLA has
the same SLA structure however, it discloses de-
tailed security-related information1 about each
CSP security offers. The customers can use this
information to assess and compare different ser-
vice offerings provided by various CSPs and then
select the best CSP that satisfies their require-
ments.
Despite the benefits of these kind of informa-
tion, still CSPs do not disclose security related
information in their secSLAs for security and/or
commercial reasons [30]. The dangers of includ-
ing security related information in the secSLA
where pointed out by ENISA [30] as:
- Publicly disclosing security parameters may
assist attackers to penetrate the system using
a hole in the publicized data. Accordingly, the
1Examples of security related information are ciphers
used to encrypt data, vulnerability management/assess-
ment procedures, minimum/average incident response
times, security controls and configuration elements such
as metrics for measuring cybersecurity performance, etc.
rate of malicious security breaches increases,
which can be much harder to detect. This can
also lead to a significant financial loss as a re-
sult of the customers compensation.
- Publicly detailing commercial sensitive infor-
mation (i.e., financial terms, service levels, cost
information, vulnerability descriptions which
may include proprietary information, etc.) can
be used by other competitors to improve their
services.
To that end, we tackle the aforementioned
problem by designing and implementing a sys-
tem called QRES (Quantitative Reasoning on
Encrypted SLAs). Our system simultaneously
allows:
1. CSPs to specify their services along with
the key measurable parameters in secSLAs,
without revealing information about the
offered security parameters or commercial
sensitive information.
2. Customers to assess and evaluate the CSP’s
offered security services and choose the best
CSP matching their needs.
In our system (Figure 1), CSPs’ encrypted
secSLAs are certified and digitally signed by
an trusted certification authority (i.e., auditor).
The trust assumption relies on the fact that the
CSPs’ certificates are valid and trusted and thus,
their encrypted secSLAs are verified and digi-
tally signed by the auditor. After a successful
authorization, every provider possesses a digital
signature on their encrypted secSLA. The CSPs
send their signed, encrypted secSLAs to an in-
termediate broker afterwards. After the broker
verifies the auditor’s signature, it stores each en-
crypted secSLA in a database.
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Furthermore, customers send their require-
ments to the broker2 which tries to match the
customer’s requirements against the stored en-
crypted data in order to find the best matching
CSP’s secSLA. During this phase, neither the
broker can learn the CSP’s encryption key nor
the CSP’s can learn the customer’s requirements.
Finally, the broker sends the customer the CSPs
ranking according to the customer requirements.
To verify the QRES system’s correctness3, we
start by formally defining the required security
properties; the presented system must ensure
the following privacy requirements: data con-
fidentiality and data fairness. Then, we con-
duct a formal security analysis of QRES us-
ing ProVerif [11], an automated cryptographic
protocol verifier, establishing the defined prop-
erties against a strong adversarial model (i.e.,
Dolev-Yao adversary model [24]). To validate
our system model, we implement QRES using
Amazon AWS DynamoDB [4]. We utilize real-
world CSPs’ secSLAs found on the public STAR
(Security, Trust and Assurance Registry) [21]
repository, which are complaint with the rele-
vant ISO/IEC 19086 standard [32].
The ProVerif scripts and proofs used in this
paper as well as the system implementation are
publicly available at [46].
Contributions. The contributions of our sys-
tem are summarized below.
1. We propose the first system (QRES ) which
enables CSPs to publicly disclose detailed
information about their offered services in
2In this paper, we assume the case of a novice or basic
customer who can not search for her/his over encrypted
data
3QRES must ensure that the entities should learn
nothing except their output and each entity should re-
ceive its correct output.
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Figure 1: QRES System Model. The system in-
volves a customer (C) who wants to find the best
CSP according to her/his needs. CSPs are certi-
fied by a trusted certification authority. A broker
(B) receives the CSPs’ encrypted secSLAs and
the customer’s requirements. Then, it ranks the
CSPs according to the customer requirements
and returns the result to the customer
encrypted secSLAs and customers to assess
the CSPs’ offered security services and find
those satisfying their requirements.
2. QRES is built around a novel two-party pri-
vacy preserving query over encrypted data
scheme (named QeSe).
3. We formally prove the system’s correct-
ness by defining the needed security prop-
erties and proving that the system holds
these properties against a strong adversarial
model.
4. We implement, evaluate and benchmark
QRES using real-world CSPs’ secSLAs. We
show that the system’s performance is prac-
tical for the presented use case.
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Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
The basic concepts of the cryptographic tools,
notations, and security definitions used are de-
veloped in Section 2. Section 3 defines the sys-
tem and threat models, as well as the system ob-
jectives and requirements. Section 4 elaborates
the architecture of the proposed system. A secu-
rity analysis of the QRES system is presented in
Section 5. The implementation of the presented
system is detailed in Section 6. We present the
related work in Section 7 and the conclusion in
Section 8.
2 Basic Concepts
This section briefly explains the basic concepts,
cryptographic tools, notations and security def-
initions used in this paper. We adapt and im-
plement well known cryptographic mechanisms,
and therefore we do not include proofs as they
already exist in the referenced papers.
2.1 Notations and Preliminaries
We summarize most of the terminology used in
Table 4 (in the Appendix). Furthermore, we de-
fine the searchable encryption notations used in
the paper in the Appendix.
2.2 Security Service Level Agree-
ments
A security service level agreement describes the
CSP’s offered security services, and represents
the binding commitment between a CSP and a
customer. Basically, each CSP’s secSLA consists
of a number of offered security services which
contain a list of Service Level Objectives (SLOs).
The SLOs are the single measurable elements
of an SLA/secSLA that specify the cloud ser-
vice levels required by the customers and to be
achieved by the CSP. Each SLO is assessed using
one or more key measurable parameters. These
parameters help in the measurement of the cloud
service objectives by defining measurement rules
that facilitate the assessment and decision mak-
ing.
For example, how a CSP recovers from inci-
dents is typically defined in terms of severity and
time to recovery. As specified by ENISA [30],
a severity classification scheme detailing levels
from 1 to 5 could be defined in an SLA, where
a “N/A” level could be included in the SLA for
incidents which have no security impact. The
criteria of each level is based on various param-
eters.
Based on the analysis of the state of practice
presented in [37], security SLAs are modeled us-
ing a hierarchical structure, as shown in Figure
2. The root of the structure defines the main
container for the secSLA. The intermediate lev-
els are the services which form the main link
to the CSP’s offered services. The lowest level
(SLO level) represents the actual SLOs commit-
ted by the CSP and consequently offered to the
cloud customer. To formalize the concept of
an SLA/secSLA, we use the definition presented
in [51].
Definition 1 An SLA consists of a set of ser-
vices S. Each service consists of a finite positive
number n of SLOs oi; where i = 1 . . . n. Each
SLO consists of l different values v; such that
oi = v1, v2, . . . , vl. Each of these values implies
a specific service level offered by the CSP and
required by the customer.
We illustrate the secSLA’s structure and func-
tionality better with an example. We consider
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a customer processing financial transactions us-
ing Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). The customer
looks for a secSLA which specifies a recovery
time objective of less than 1 minute and a
monthly report offered by the selected CSP spec-
ifying the mean recovery times [30]. Using this
example we specify two SLOs (“Percentage of
timely incident reports S1.1.1” and “Recovery
time S1.1.2”) as shown in Figure 2. The “Percent-
age of timely incident reports” SLO is composed
of {yearly, half − yearly,monthly, weekly} val-
ues which are defined using service levels as
level1, level2, . . . , level4 respectively. If a CSP
is committing a “Percentage of timely incident
reports” of monthly, then vS1.1.1 = level3. Sim-
ilarly, a CSP commits other SLOs so that the
overall CSP’s secSLA contains a list of SLOs
with different values that is committed to fulfil.
Entitlement category 
(S2.1)
Percentage of 
timely incident 
reports (S1.1.1)
Recovery time 
(S1.1.2)
Crypt brute force 
resistance 
(S2.1.1)
Password 
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(S2.1.2)
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o
o
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Services level
Cloud secSLA
Identity and Access 
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Information Security 
Incident Management 
(S1.1)
 
Application 
&Interface 
Security
AIS (S2)
Figure 2: Cloud secSLA hierarchy based on se-
curity posture provided by the STAR repository
and compliant with the relevant ISO/IEC 19086
standard.
< SLA slaid=‘‘sla1”>
<service id=‘‘S1” name =‘‘Identity and Access Management
” category=‘‘IAM” pre=‘‘1”>
<control id=‘‘S1.1” name =‘‘Information Security Incident
Management” category=‘‘IAM−09” pre=‘‘2”>
<slo id=‘‘S1.1.1” name =‘‘Percentage of timely incident
reports” value=‘‘level3’’ pre=‘‘3”></slo>
<slo id=‘‘S1.1.2” name =‘‘Recovery time” value=‘‘level2”
pre=‘‘4”’></slo>
</control></service></ SLA>
Listing 1: Excerpt of the SLA depicted in Figure
2
Format of secSLAs. The secSLA shown in
Figure 2 can be specified using a machine read-
able format such as an XML structure as de-
picted in Listing 1. The XML data values can be
captured using the pre-fields shown in Listing 1
(named “pre”), which are sequence numbers that
count the open tags in an XML. An example of
how the pre-fields are computed is depicted in
Table 1. Each pre-field is used as a service iden-
tifier as each service/SLO has a unique pre-field
in the secSLA.
XML structure pre-field
< S1 > 1
< S1.1 > 2
< S1.1.1 value=level3 > 3
< S1.1.2 value=level2 > 4
< /S1.1 >
Table 1: Excerpt of an SLA XML structure with
the calculation of pre-fields
Note that, customers can only assess the CSPs
and choose the best one satisfying their require-
ments, only if the CSPs’ shared information are
relevant to customers’ concerns (i.e., stemmed
from customers’ requirements) [38]. To achieve
this, the customer C has to create her/his set of
requirements using the same secSLA-XML struc-
ture used by the CSP.
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2.3 Searching Over Encrypted Data
We define the problem of searching over en-
crypted data using the following example. As-
sume a customer who encrypts her/his docu-
ments and stores those at the CSP’s storage
server. However, by encrypting these docu-
ments, the customer can not search for certain
keywords anymore and thus, content retrieving is
very inefficient. The basic approach for retriev-
ing the required data related to a certain key-
word would require the customer to download all
stored encrypted documents, and then decrypt
them to perform the keyword search. However,
this solution is time consuming and impractical.
In addition, retrieving all files incurs unneces-
sary network traffic, which is undesirable in the
pay-as-you-use cloud paradigm used today.
From the above problems, the need arises for
an efficient data retrieval scheme which enables
the customer to search directly over encrypted
data. A solution to this problems is what is
widely known as searchable encryption (SE). SE
allows a customer to encrypt data in such a way
that she/he can later generate search tokens to
send queries to the CSP. Given these tokens, the
CSP can search over the encrypted data and re-
trieve the required encrypted files. As specified
in [33], a SE scheme is secure if: (i) the cipher-
text alone reveal no information about the en-
crypted data, (ii) the encrypted data together
with a search token (i.e., queries) reveals at most
the result of the search, and (iii) search tokens
can only be generated using the same encryption
key used to encrypt the data.
There exists a large number of SE schemes
[10, 16, 33, 50] which are either deterministic or
randomized. Deterministic schemes [10] encrypt
the same message to the same ciphertext. How-
ever, it does not protect against frequency anal-
ysis attacks. On the other hand, randomized
schemes [33, 50] prevent frequency analysis by
salting ciphertexts and thus providing stronger
security guarantees. However, the usage of salt
in these schemes requires combining each token
with each salt, resulting in a processing time lin-
ear in the number of salts for each token. In [49]
Sherry et al., introduced an encryption scheme
which achieves both the detection speed of deter-
ministic encryption and the security of random-
ized encryption. Our system uses a deterministic
encryption scheme for searchable encryption.
2.4 Privacy Preserving Computations
Secure two party computation. The aim of
secure two-party computation is to enable both
parties to carry out computing tasks without re-
vealing information of any kind about private
data to the participants. Assume two parties,
A and B have some private information. They
want to learn the result of some function us-
ing both of their inputs, while each party would
learn nothing about the other party input. To
achieve this, Yao’s protocol based on garbled cir-
cuit (named Yao garbled circuit) [36,53] is used.
Yao’s protocol based on garbled circuits allow
two parties to exchange a garbled circuit and
garbled inputs for a function, which can be used
to compute an output without leaking informa-
tion about their inputs.
A garbled circuit is a circuit that consists of
garbled gates and their decryption tables. In a
garbled gate, two random bits have been selected
for every input wire to the gate, representing 0
and 1. Those bits garble the gate, making it
impossible to compute the output unless some-
one has access to the garbled computation table.
The garbled computation table maps essentially
the random inputs to the output of the gate,
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which is also random.
We illustrate the basic idea of how Yao’s gar-
bled circuit can be used, assume two parties A
and B that have secret inputs, x and y respec-
tively. Both of them want to compute F (x, y)
without revealing their private inputs to each
other (x to B and y to A). To achieve this, one
party (for instance A) prepares a garbled ver-
sion of the computing function F (named GarF ).
Basically, GarF produces the same output as
F (x, y), if given the corresponding encoding of
each bit of both inputs x and y.
The inputs garbling is done by producing a
pair of labels for each input bit of F (G0, G1,
that is one label corresponds to bit 0 and the
other to 1). Next, A sends GarF along with the
encoding of x to B, which only needs the encod-
ing of y from A to compute the GarF without
learning any intermediate values. For this task,
both parties use oblivious transfer [7, 39,47].
Oblivious transfer (OT). OT is a crucial
component of the garbled circuit approach, as it
enables party B to obtain the encoding of the b
bit from A, without (i) A knowing b and (ii) B
learning the encoding scheme. In this way, party
B can request from A the keys that he can use
for his input encoding without i) A learning B’
input and ii) B exploiting the protocol by having
access to the encoding scheme and computing
much more than allowed.
3 Requirements Analysis
In this section, we describe the system model,
present the system requirements, and define our
threat and trust models.
3.1 System Overview
Finding the best matching CSP (according to the
customer’s security requirements) is the objec-
tive of the proposed system. Our system model
(depicted in Figure 1) involves m CSPs4, a cus-
tomer C, and a broker B. The customer C is a
company or an individual who is searching for
the best provider that satisfies her/his require-
ments. The CSPs are cloud providers that dis-
close information about the offered security pos-
ture in their secSLAs. CSPs are encrypting their
secSLAs before sending them to the broker. The
broker B is an entity that performs the search-
ing of the customer requirements over the CSPs’
encrypted secSLAs on behalf of the customer.
Hence, B ranks and manages the selection of the
best matching CSP.
3.2 Threat Model
Security literature distinguishes between two ad-
versarial model for secure computation; partici-
pants can be either semi-honest or malicious. In
this work we consider a semi-honest (also known
as honest-but-curious) threat model. This is a
commonly used security model for secure com-
putation (we refer the reader to Goldreich [29]
for details) where the semi-honest participants
correctly follow the introduced protocol but at-
tempt to obtain additional information about
the other participants. By considering the semi-
honest model, a dishonest participant observing
the system’s network should not be able to alter
or recover stored data.
The semi-honest setting is relevant in this
study, as all entities, the CSP, B, and C, would
4Throughout the paper, we explain our model and
queries searching scheme using only one CSP. Neverthe-
less, the same model applies for all CSPs.
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like to continue the protocol; acquire the best
matching CSP according to C’s requirements.
However, each entity can attempt to obtain addi-
tional information about the other entity’s input
as depicted in Table 2.
Customer
C
Tries to learn the CSP’s pri-
vate key k in order to learn the
CSP’s secSLA
Cloud
Provider
CSP
Tries to learn C’s require-
ments or sends a faulty sec-
SLA5
Broker
B
Tries to (a) alter C’s require-
ments in order to match a col-
luded CSP, or (b) collude with
C to learn the CSPs’ secSLAs
and identify their identities
Table 2: The semi-honest threat model of our
system. Every entity tries to enhance their
knowledge about the others while following the
protocol.
3.3 Trust Model
In this paper we consider a trusted auditor. Be-
fore detailing the proposed system model, we
note that customers can only trust the result of
an assessment if the information taken as an in-
put is reliable. In other words, in order to guar-
antee the validity of the proposed system, the
encrypted secSLAs provided by the participating
CSPs are required to be certified from the trusted
certification authority (the auditor). For exam-
ple, an auditor certifying the CSP’s security pos-
ture as reflected by its secSLA (e.g., based on
an ISO 27001 certificate [20]). The trust as-
sumption relies on the fact that the CSPs’ cer-
tificates are valid and trusted and thus, their en-
crypted secSLAs are verified and digitally signed.
Such signing scheme should provide a proving
statement without revealing the secSLA input.
For simplicity, we assume that the participat-
ing CSP’s encrypted secSLAs are to be verified
and digitally signed. We summarize the initial
knowledge of each entity in Table 3.
Parameter
Each entity’s knowledge
C CSP B Auditor
CSP’s secSLA ×
CSP’s Encryp-
tion Key
×
CSP’s Certifi-
cate/ID
× ×
C’s Require-
ments
× ×
Table 3: In the table we summarize every entity’s
initial knowledge. Every participating entity has
minimal knowledge regarding the others.
3.4 System Requirements
In order to provide the privacy and correctness
guarantees, the presented system must ensure:
1) Input Validation: The CSPs’ encrypted sec-
SLAs provided by the participating CSPs are
digitally signed by an auditor.
2) Fairness: The system must ensure that if
one entity (CSP or B) quits the computation,
it can not learn more information than the
other entity. In other words, none of the en-
tities can learn the result first and then abort.
3) Data Confidentiality: The encrypted CSP’s
secSLA can only be decrypted using its CSP’s
private key k. Further, the broker B should
only learn the output of the searching queries
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(i.e., the search queries represent the cus-
tomer requirements). Moreover, the CSP
should not have access to C’s requirements
to avoid changing its secSLA specifications
according to those.
Note that, B or C can ensure the secSLA com-
pliance by monitoring and verifying the of-
fered service levels by (i) using appropriate
log samples provided by the CSP, and/or (ii)
adding alerts and triggers based on the ser-
vice key measurable parameters [30]. How-
ever, in this paper we only focus on the CSPs
evaluation and services assessment and refer
the readers to [30, 52] for further monitoring
process details.
4 QRES Architecture
In this section, we detail each of QRES
phases using the progressive stages depicted
in Figure 3. As stated earlier, as an initial
phase the customers register and are verified
by the broker B before paying the broker for
the offered assessment service. Furthermore,
we assume that the broker’s certificate (certB)
is validated by the auditor. Then, send by the
auditor to the CSPs.
Stage 1: Providers Authorization.
Every CSP is first registered and verified by
a trusted auditor. The auditor verifies the
CSPs certificate and then signs the encrypted
secSLA. The broker B can verify the validity
of the encrypted secSLAs by checking for the
auditor’s signature.
Stage 2: Tokenization.
After C creates her/his set of requirements us-
ing the same secSLA-XML structure as used
by the CSP (similar to the template shown in
Listing 1)6, both the CSP and C tokenize their
secSLA-XML data specifications such that:
• Each CSP splits its specified services (in
the secSLA) into substrings. For every
substring, it creates a fixed length token
( 8 bytes per token as depicted in Table
4). The generated tokens are denoted as
“tCSP”, such that TCSP = t
1
CSP, . . . , t
n
CSP;
where TCSP specifies the set of services
offered by the CSP in its secSLA and n
is the number of tokens.
• Similarly, C splits her/his requirements
into substrings and then generates a
fixed 8 bytes token for every substring.
The customer’s generated tokens are
named “keywords” and denoted as “wC”
so that WC = w
1
C, . . . , w
n
C; where WC is
the set of customer requirements.
Both the customer and the CSP use the same
secSLA template with the same services/S-
LOs where each of them specify different SLO
values. Tokens are generated for each SLO,
by searching for the SLO id and extracting
only its value and pre-field of the specified
SLO (i.e., each SLO in an SLA XML has a
unique pre-field as specified earlier and de-
picted in Table 1). For example, the tokens
generated from Listing 1 are: “level3||3” and
“level2||4”. Therefore, for each secSLA no
6Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has created a consen-
sus assessments initiative questionnaire (CAIQ) [19], to
define the controls contained in an SLA. CSPs have used
it as an SLA template by detailing their offered controls
and publishing them on the STAR repository [21].
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Figure 3: QRES System Architecture. Every step is ordered with an increasing number. The
procedure in our system begins with an auditor verifying the cloud providers. Then continues
with the tokenization of the secSLAs and the customers’ requirements and ends with the QESE
protocol. This protocol enable the matching between the requirements and the secSLAs in the
encrypted domain.
similar tokens can be generated as no equal
pre-fields exist. Even if the CSP is offering
two values for a specific SLO, both tokens
would be different because of the different val-
ues.
Stage 3: Tokens Encryption.
QRES utilizes a deterministic encryption
scheme Enc(k, x), such that the encryption
of the CSP token (tCSP) is denoted by
Enc(k, tCSP). For instance, in order to check
if the CSP’s token (tCSP) is matching the cus-
tomer keyword (wC), we can simply check if
Enc(k, tCSP) is equal to Enc(k, wC). Unfor-
tunately, deterministic encryption schemes,
which are rather fast, cannot be used in ev-
ery case, as every occurrence of tCSP will re-
sult to the same ciphertext. However, this is
not the case in our system as every generated
token tCSP is unique by design in the CSP’s
secSLA, as every token contains different pre-
field. Therefore, we utilize the AES − CBC
encryption scheme to encrypt each CSP’s gen-
erated token AESk(tCSP). We use a typi-
cal instantiation of a hash function, which is
SHA256, to compute the initialization vector
(refer to Table 4 for the hash function defini-
tion).
Stage 4: Tokens Transfer.
Both the CSP and the customer, send their
tokens to the broker. B verifies the auditor’s
signature and then saves the CSP’s encrypted
tokens in a database. For m CSPs, B saves m
different lists with encrypted tokens.
Stage 5: Keywords Transfer.
In this stage, B receives C’s requirements (i.e.,
keywords) securely via an encrypted channel
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Provider(CSP) Broker(B)
knowledge : knowledge :
skCSP, pkCSP, pkB, k
auth
CSP , t
1
CSP, . . . , t
n
CSP skB, pkB, k
auth
CSP , w
1
C, . . . , w
n
C
[1] kGar←$KGen(1n)
[2] GarEnck ← Enc(k, kGar)
[3] Using OT: [3] Using OT:
Gw
1
C ← w1C Sig(skB, w
1
C) w1C := w
1
0 . . . w
1
n
where Gw
1
C := Gw
1
0 . . . Gw
1
n
Sig(skB, G
w1C )← Sig(skB, w1C)
GarEnck
Sig(skB, G
w1C )
[4] Verify(pkB,Sig(skB, G
w1C ) valid?
[5] cG
w1C ←$GarEnck(Gw1C )
cG
w1C := Enc(k, w1C)
[6 d←$ Search(cw1C , ct1CSP . . . ct
n
CSP)
Figure 4: Secure computation protocol between a CSP and the broker (QeSe). The initial knowledge
and the generation of the garbled circuit are depicted in lines 1 and 2. The oblivious transfer start
in line 3 and the secure two party computation protocol ends at line 5. Then, the broker has
acquired the Enc(k, w1C) and can match the requirements to the secSLAs.
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(e.g., SSL).
Once B receives C’s messages, it saves the
messages and starts a secure two-party com-
putation with each CSP in order to find the
best matching CSP according to C’s security
requirements in the next stage.
Cloud Provider
(P)
Broker 
(B)
Garbled Enc 
(GarEnc)
Garbled Enc 
(GarEnc)
Oblivious 
Transfer
Figure 5: Illustration of the Secure Computa-
tion Protocol between the CSP and the broker
(QeSe).
Stage 6: Query Search (QeSe).
In order to design and build such a privacy
preserving system, several challenges need to
be addressed:
- In order for customers to search over the
encrypted secSLAs, they must have access
to the same secret keys as the CSPs. Conse-
quently, the system should uphold the pri-
vacy of all parties by allowing customers
to search/match their requirements blindly
without neither the CSPs learning the cus-
tomers’ queries, nor the broker (or cus-
tomer) obtaining the CSP’s secret key.
- In addition, the system should prevent ma-
licious CSPs from deliberately providing
false information trying to match the cus-
tomer requirements.
- Lastly, the system should prevent malicious
customers from just gathering information
about each CSP offered services and then
quitting (i.e., by performing several search-
ing iterations, each iteration with different
requirements or by performing frequency
analysis).
To tackle these problems, QRES utilizes a
novel two-party privacy preserving query over
an encrypted data scheme (named QeSe).
QeSe is based on two-party privacy pre-
serving computation (i.e., Yao garbled cir-
cuit [36, 53]) to allow CSPs to encrypt the
customers’ search queries without learning
them. Accordingly, customers can find the
best matching CSP’s secSLA without know-
ing the CSP’s encryption key. Furthermore,
the protocol supports a new security property
by enhancing the security setting of the tra-
ditional two-party privacy preserving compu-
tation (Yao garbled circuit evaluation). This
is achieved by validating the participants’ in-
puts (i.e., CSP’s secSLA and broker’s signa-
ture on the customer’s keywords) before com-
putation.
QeSe. For simplicity, we explain this stage
using one CSP and B. The broker B has
already stored each CSP encrypted tokens
(Enc(k, tCSP)) (from the previous steps) in a
database. Furthermore, B has already re-
ceived the customer keywords. In order to
find the encrypted tokens matching the cus-
tomer keywords, they have to be encrypted
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by the same encryption key used by CSP to
encrypt the tokens. In other words, B has
to compute Enc(k, wC) for every wC using the
same encryption key used by the CSP. The
main challenge here is for B to obtain the en-
crypted wC without knowing the CSP’s secret
key k and without allowing the CSP to learn
wC.
QeSe allows all parties to jointly achieve their
purpose (exchange k so wC can be encrypted)
by running a secure two party computation
between the CSP and the broker. We en-
hance the security setting of the traditional
two-party privacy preserving computation by
allowing the garbled circuit to also check the
validity of both the encrypted tokens and the
broker’s digital signature of the customer’s re-
quirements. In case there is a problem with
the validation our protocol quits.
The CSP provides B with a “garble” of the en-
cryption function with the key k hardcoded
in it, as depicted in Figure 4 (line 2) and
Figure 5 (we denote this garbled function by
GarEnck). This garbling hides the CSP’s se-
cret key k. GarEnck(x) produces the same
output of Enc(k, x) if given the correspond-
ing encoding of each bit of input x (i.e., Gx).
Thus, B can run this garbled function on each
keyword wC in order to obtain the Enc(k, wC)
only if he is able to acquire from the CSP
an encoding for the wC (G
wC) as depicted in
line 3 in Figure 4. For this task, both par-
ties (CSP and B) use an oblivious transfer
protocol, where B receives an encoding of wC
from the CSP without revealing wC. The en-
coding of keywords w1C, . . . , w
n
C is denoted as
G
w1C
1 , . . . , G
wnC
n . Similarly, the broker receives
the encoding of Sig(skV, G
w1C
1 ), that is the en-
coding of the keyword’s signature (line 3 in
Figure 4). Note that, on input Sig(skB, wC),
GarEnck first checks if Sig(skB, wC) is a valid
signature of wC using B’s public key (pkB). If
it is valid, wC is encrypted as Enc(k, wC). It
is important for the security of the protocol
to mention that, a garbled circuit is no longer
secure if B receives more than one encoding
for the same circuit. Thus, B obtains a fresh,
re-encrypted garbled circuit GarEnck for ev-
ery wC. At the end of this process, B gets
the Enc(k, wC) for every wC. Afterwards, B
searches for an exact matching of Enc(k, wC)
over all CSPs encrypted tokens (as depicted in
line 6 in Figure 4). Each successful matching
result is saved in a list at B using an index d.
The process is repeated for all CSPs. Hence,
for m CSPs, B creates m lists. Each of these
lists contains the number of encrypted tokens
matching C’s keywords.
Stage 7: CSPs Ranking.
As a last step, the CSPs are evaluated and
ranked according to the number of tokens
matching the customer requirements. The
CSP with the highest number of encrypted
tokens matching the customer keywords, is
given the highest score and selected as the
best matching provider.
5 Security Analysis
In this section we formally analyse and ver-
ify the security considerations of the system
architecture described in Section 4, with re-
spect to the security requirements defined in
Section 3.4.
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5.1 Formal Analysis
Formal methods can be used to model a cryp-
tographic protocol and its security properties
against an adversarial model, together with
an efficient procedure to determine whether
a model satisfies those properties.
In this section, we analyse the security of
the proposed system protocols with respect
to the security objectives outlined in Section
3.4 using ProVerif [11]. ProVerif is an au-
tomated verification tool that can handle an
unbounded number of protocol sessions. It
is used to model cryptographic protocols and
their security properties against a strong ad-
versarial model. In contrast to other state-
of-the-art tools (e.g., the Avispa tools [5] and
Scyther [22]), ProVerif provides a larger fea-
ture set [23]. Furthermore, it allows the mod-
elling of cryptographic primitives using equa-
tional theory which is used to model the Yao’s
garbled circuit protocol.
In order to verify a system’s security, first
we define a list of security properties. Then,
the context in which the system functions
are created. The system’s context consists
of assumptions about the environment and
the adversarial model. We model the for-
mal specification of the QeSe protocol, the
security objectives and the adversary model
using applied pi-calculus [11]. The applied
pi-calculus modelling is used as an input to
the ProVerif tool. ProVerif then proves if
the claimed security properties are fulfilled.
We refer the readers to Appendix 8 for more
details about the applied pi-calculus seman-
tics and for more details about protocol mod-
elling and the property verification. The for-
mal specification includes the following com-
ponents:
1. Agent model. Agents represent
the protocol parties which execute the roles
of the protocol. For instance, we have the
sender and the receiver roles in the protocol.
Therefore, in each protocol, each agent per-
forms one or more roles. The agent model is
based on a “closed world assumption”, which
means that honest agents show no behaviour
other than the one described in the protocol
specification (this model corresponds to
honest-but-curious threat model in Section
3.2).
2. Communication channel. The
communication model describes how the
messages are exchanged between the agents.
The channel can be private or public accord-
ing to the threat model. In our scenario the
channel is public.
3. Threat model. Adversaries are
modelled as agents that aim to violate the
security objectives. ProVerif uses the stan-
dard Dolev-Yao adversary model [24]. In this
model the adversary has complete control
over the public communication network.
4. Protocol specification. The pro-
tocol specification describes the behaviour of
each of the roles in the protocol. The system
does not execute the actual protocol but it
executes the protocol roles performed by the
agents.
To model QeSe protocol, we model Yao’s
garbled circuit protocol to verify Data con-
fidentiality and Fairness. Two agents are
used to model our protocol in the applied
14
pi-calculus (i.e., one CSP and one broker B).
Based on Yao’s circuit two algorithms are de-
fined (namely garble Gar and evaluate Eval).
Gar takes an input function with n bits and
outputs a garbled function and a pair of la-
bels for each input bit of the function. Eval
takes the garbled function and garbled inputs
and returns the required function output.
We model the CSP’s encryption function as a
public parameter represented by a free vari-
ables zf (i.e., free variable is similar to global
scope in programming languages; that is, free
names are globally known). The private pa-
rameters of the CSP and B are the proto-
col inputs (the encryption key and the key-
word, respectively). The CSP’s and B’s pri-
vate parameters are represented as free vari-
ables xCSP and yB, respectively.
The goal of B is to obtain the encryption of
its keyword using the CSP’s key. To achieve
this we use the protocol specification shown
in Figures 4. The garbling function is mod-
elled using a generated random key, named
as the garbling key Gar(., kGar). The garbling
key is used to securely garble the circuit at
each protocol run (as stated earlier, to en-
sure the garbled circuit security, B receives
a fresh, re-encrypted garbled circuit for each
input Gar(yB, kGar)).
To model the oblivious transfer, the Broker
B generates a commitment of each keyword
with a fresh generated nonce. The commit-
ment of each keyword cannot be modified and
is hidden using the nonce. The commitment
is used to request a garbling of the keyword
from the CSP without disclosing the keyword
to the CSP. We do model the encryption
output as Eval(zf , xCSP, yB), where both CSP
and B want to find the keyword encryption
output without disclosing xCSP to B and yB
to CSP.
5. Security properties. These proper-
ties specify the security requirements of the
protocol defined in Section 3.4.
(a) Data Confidentiality: Modelling
strong secrecy to verify the encrypted
SLA’s confidentiality is straightforward
and modelled easily in ProVerif (adver-
sary learns nothing about the SLA).
However, to prove the confidentiality
property in QeSe, we have to prove that
the only leakage about the input of the
two parties (CSP and B) should come
from the result of the evaluated func-
tion. In other words, if a party obtained
the output of the evaluated function, no
leakage should occur about the two par-
ties’ inputs.
This is proved using the indistinguisha-
bility property (the notion of indistin-
guishability is generally named observa-
tional equivalence in the formal model
[11]). Intuitively, two processes (P1 and
P2 are observationally equivalent (i.e.,
written P1 ≈ P2), when an attacker can-
not distinguish between the two. For-
mal definitions of the indistinguishabil-
ity property can be found in [2,14]. For
example, the privacy property of an elec-
tronic voting protocol is expressed as
[11]:
P (skA, v1)|P (skB, v2) ≈ P (skA, v2)|P (skB, v1)
P is the voting process, and an attacker
cannot distinguish between the two sit-
uations; i) in which A votes for v1 and
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B votes for v2 from ii) that A votes for
v2 and B for v1, where v1 and v2 are the
candidates for whom A and B vote.
To prove the data confidentiality, we
model two processes that are replicated
an unbounded number of time and
executed in parallel. In the first process
P1, CSP and B sends two inputs,
represented as free variables x0CSP and
y0B, respectively. While in the second
process P2, the CSP and B sends free
variables x1CSP and y
1
B, respectively. If
the two defined processes are observa-
tionally equivalent (P1 ≈ P2), then we
say that the attacker cannot distinguish
between the two process input.
Theorem 1: Data confidentiality is
preserved in the system if P1 and P2
are observationally equivalent (P1 ≈
P2). In our protocol this is proven using
ProVerif.
(b) Fairness: In QeSe, fairness is pre-
served if the final result obtained by
both parties CSP (sender) and B (re-
ceiver) after a secured computation
is consistent. None of the parties
can learn the result first and then
abort. This can be proved using
the ProVerif’s correspondence property
[12]. An example of the correspon-
dence property is, e(M1, . . . ,Mj) =⇒
e′(N1, . . . , Nk) , where for any trace of
the protocol for each occurrence of event
e(M1, . . . ,Mj), there is a previous oc-
currence of e′(N1, . . . , Nk).
Therefore, we define the fairness prop-
erty as follows:
CSPterm(zf , xCSP, yB, r) =⇒
yB = com(y1, n) ∧ r = Eval(zf , xCSP, y1) and
Bterm(zf , xCSP, yB, r
′) =⇒
xCSP = Gar(x1, kGar) ∧ r′ = Eval(zf , x1, yB)(1)
Note that, the CSP’s and B’s private
parameters are represented using free
variables xCSP and yB as stated earlier.
The property in equation 1 states that
the CSP with arguments zf , xCSP, yB, r
terminates a protocol run with B af-
ter (i) CSP receives a commitment of
B’s input with a random value n (yB =
com(y1, n)) and (ii) finding the result r
of the of the function zf on inputs xCSP
and y1. Similarly, B terminates the pro-
tocol run with the CSP after receiving
the CSP’s garbled input xCSP and find-
ing the result r′ of the garbling function
zf on inputs x1, yB.
Using the correspondence property
defined in equation 1, the process
!(CSP(zf , xCSP))|!(B(zf , yB)), which
models the two agents processes and
can be executed any number of sessions.
Theorem 2: Fairness of all possi-
ble executions of sessions of honest
parties in process P is preserved if
the correspondence property defined in
equation 1 is true. For our protocol this
is proved using Proverif.
5.2 Further Security Considerations
Our system and its protocol are designed and
verified against honest but curious entities.
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However, with minor protocol modifications our
system mitigate against malicious parties.
5.2.1 Malicious entities
- Malicious CSP: In the case of a malicious
CSP, it might send (i) an incorrect garbling
function to broker B, and/or (ii) a faulty en-
crypted secSLA. To prevent the first form of
attack (i), B can prove that the garbling is
correct by using the “cut-and-choose” tech-
nique [31, 35]. Under this technique, a CSP
constructs n versions of the circuit, each struc-
tured identically but garbled differently so that
the keys for each gate in each circuit is unique.
Additionally, the CSP generates a commitment
for each of its garbled inputs. The CSP then
sends each of the garbled circuits with its gar-
bled inputs to B. Further, B selects n − 1
versions of the circuit to verify. The CSP de-
garbles each of the n − 1 selected circuits, so
that B can verify that each of the revealed
circuits are constructed correctly and as ex-
pected.
B checks whether the CSP’s garbled inputs
match their corresponding (previously sent
commitments). If everything is correct, B eval-
uates the rest of the circuits and derives the
output from them. Thus, if a malicious CSP
constructs the circuits incorrectly, B will de-
tect this with high probability. Regarding
faulty SLA’s, as explained earlier, an auditor
(whose reputation depends on its trustworthi-
ness) first ensures the validity of the CSP’s in-
put and thus prevents any CSP from providing
faulty encrypted SLAs.
- Malicious customer: A single customer or
a group of colluded customers can try to use
the QRES system to find each CSPs security
posture. Each of the colluded entities can spec-
ify different requirements and at the end, each
customer gets the best matching CSP’s sec-
SLA according to her/his requirements. To
better illustrate this kind of attack, we show
an empirical validation of the proposed sys-
tem through the secSLA information used in
the implementation section; a secSLA with 50
SLOs, where each SLO is composed of four ser-
vice levels. The number of possible SLA com-
binations is “450” (i.e., generally xy, where x is
the number of service levels and y is the num-
ber of SLOs). Each customer keyword takes
on average “0.52” seconds to search over one
CSP’s encrypted secSLA with 50 SLOs with
1 level each (i.e., we demonstrate the system
evaluation and performance in Section 6; as de-
picted in Figure 6). Thus to find all the possi-
ble combinations, it takes 2∗1022 years to learn
a CSP encrypted secSLA. Hence, this type of
attack is not feasible in our system. In ad-
dition, countermeasures with specific time be-
tween sequential queries could be implemented
in the either the broker or the CSP.
- Malicious broker: A theoretical attack that
a broker could perform would be to attempt
and alter C’s keywords. However, such an at-
tack would be immediately detected by the
customer as at the end they get to know the se-
curity details they ‘negotiated’ with the cloud
provider.
5.2.2 Providing CSP Anonymity
System Changes The QRES system should
prevent malicious customers to ascertain infor-
mation about each CSP offered services (i.e., by
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performing several searching iterations, each it-
eration with different requirements or by per-
forming frequency analysis). To prevent mali-
cious customers from learning information about
CSPs SLAs, QRES allows the customers to
search for their requirements over “anonymous”
CSPs encrypted secSLAs. The CSPs anonymity
mitigates the malicious customers attacks as cus-
tomers learn the result of the searching queries
and nothing else.
In order for QRES to provide anonymity for
the CSPs, the auditor should first generate a
unique authentication secret for each CSP dur-
ing their registration phase. This secret then
is send to the broker. Every communication
between the broker and the CSP runs over
onion routing [48] anonymity network to ensure
anonymity of CSPs. In addition, the CSP gener-
ates an authentication challenge using the hash
of a nonce and their unique authentication se-
crets. The challenge together with the nonce
are send to the broker. The broker stores the
nonces and the challenges alongside with every
CSP’s secSLA, but cannot tell the real identities
of the CSPs. After finding the best matching
CSP, the selected CSP’s authentication secret is
sent to the auditor by the broker in order to iden-
tify the CSP’s identity. Next, the auditor sends
the selected CSP’s identity to B to manage the
agreement between both the CSP and the cus-
tomer.
Verifying Anonymity In order to verify the
anonymity property of this modification of the
QRES system, we use the ProVerif tool. We
model two processes that are replicated an un-
bounded number of time and executed in par-
allel. In each process two CSPs participate by
sending their tokens. First, each CSP constructs
an OR circuit and sends the onion data (CSP1 ↔
N1 ↔ N2 ↔ N3) and (CSP2 ↔ N1 ↔ N2 ↔
N3). Then, each of the intermediate nodes (N1
and N2) removes one layer of encryption and at
the end forwards the onion to N3. Finally, once
the exit node N3 receives the two onions from the
two CSPs, it removes the last layer and sends the
messages to B.
In the first process P1, CSP1 and CSP2 sends
two tokens t1 and t2, respectively. Once the exit
nodeN3 removes the last onion layer, it sends the
message to B on a public channel (t1||t2). In the
second process P2, the two tokens are swapped;
such that CSP1 and CSP2 sends t2 and t1, respec-
tively. Similarly, N3 publishes the message on a
public channel (t2||t1). The CSPs anonymity is
preserved if an attacker cannot distinguish be-
tween the two messages and hence, cannot learn
which token is sent by which CSP. Nodes trans-
fer messages to each other using a public channel.
If the two defined processes are observation-
ally equivalent (P1 ≈ P2), then we say that the
attacker cannot distinguish between t1 and t2,
which means the attacker is unable to distinguish
when the message changes. Hence, the attacker
is not able to link two communication streams
of the same CSP, and thus cannot learn which
message is sent by which CSP.
Theorem 3: The observational equivalence
of P1 and P2 defined in equation 2 holds (P1 ≈
P2).
P1(t1, t2) ≈ P2(t2, t1) (2)
6 Implementation and Evalua-
tion
Implementation. QRES is implemented in
Java, using Apache-Tomcat 9.0 and Amazon
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DynamoDB [4] database, which is a NoSQL
database service. The DynamoDB supports
both string and key value store models which
we used to store the encrypted tokens (B side).
We used Tomcat web server on our Ubuntu ma-
chine to transmit the encrypted data to Ama-
zon DynamoDB (the CSP side). We implement
the hash functions using HMAC based on SHA-
256. The symmetric encryption scheme is im-
plemented based on AES 128. Moreover, we use
β = 128 for nonces and 8 bytes per token. Fur-
thermore, we modified Yao’s garbled circuit cod-
ing [17] to fit our encryption scheme. Finally, we
implemented two Java Server Page (JSP) files to
send the tokens and to search for the keywords.
The complete source code along with a detailed
explanation of setting up and using the QRES
can be found at [46].
Performance Evaluation. We evaluate the
performance of the QeSe protocol running be-
tween the CSP and the B using two use-cases.
First, we use QReS with one CSP which is offer-
ing various tokens (SLOs) in its secSLA . Note
that, the CSP is offering one service level for each
SLO in its secSLA. Each token (8 bytes) is en-
crypted and sent to Amazon DynamoDB. Figure
6 shows the amount of time spent by a broker
to search for the customer keywords (i.e. 5,10,
20 and 50 keywords ) over 10, 20, 50 and 150
SLOs provided by one CSP. The use-case shows
that the time to search for the customer’s dif-
ferent keywords over various number of SLOs is
almost the same despite the number of the of-
fered SLOs. This is expected as the most time
consuming part of the computation, that is the
computation of the circuits, is the same despite
the amount of offered SLOs.
Further, we explore the case in which a cus-
tomer compares various CSPs based on their ad-
vertised secSLAs. Figure 7 shows the amount
of time a broker spends to search for the cus-
tomer requirements (keywords) over 1, 10 and
30 CSPs’ secSLAs where each secSLA consists
of 150 SLOs. For each CSP’s secSLA, we ex-
tracted 150 tokens (8 bytes each) which are then
encrypted and sent to Amazon DynamoDB (in
our current implementation we saved each CSP
token in a different table). The use-case shows
a linear time progression as the broker searches
for more keywords in each CSP’s table.
The SLOs are extracted from the public STAR
repository [21]. The rationale for using STAR
repository is that (i) to the best of our knowl-
edge no other cloud SLA repositories are publicly
available and (ii) major CSPs are still in the pro-
cess of restructuring their SLAs by leveraging the
recently published ISO/IEC 19086. Currently,
the STAR contains reports with CSP’s answers
to Consensus Assessments Initiative Question-
naire [19] with yes/no answers. Furthermore, we
utilized other requirements defined in multiple
research projects such as A4cloud [41], CUMU-
LUS [42], and SPECS [45].
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Figure 6: Time used by a customer to search for
her/his different keywords over varied number of
SLOs offered by one CSP.
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Figure 7: Time used by the customers to search
for their different keywords over 150 SLOs of-
fered by varied CSPs.
7 Related Work
In this section we describe the related work
which falls into four categories: security quan-
tification, secured computation, searchable en-
cryption, and formal analysis.
Security quantification: Security require-
ments for non-cloud scenarios have been ad-
dressed by Casola et al. [18], who propose a
methodology to evaluate security SLAs for web
services. In [18], the authors propose a method-
ology to assess security SLAs for web services.
In [26] and [34], the authors propose a technique
to aggregate security metrics from web services
security SLAs. However, in contrast to our work,
the previous work did not empirically validate
the specified metrics. In [3], the authors propose
the notion of evaluating cloud SLAs by introduc-
ing a metric to benchmark the security of a CSP
based on categories. However, all of the pre-
viously mentioned approaches do not allow the
CSPs to specify their security posture.
Secure computation: Fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE) [28] and other general func-
tional encryption [27] schemes can be used to
compute functions over encrypted data. How-
ever, they do not address all our desired secu-
rity properties, and they are prohibitively slow
for the selected usecase. Some recent systems
such as CryptDB [43] and Mylar [44] support
secure computation efficiently. However, these
systems enables certain types of search over the
encrypted data which are not matching our re-
quired properties. In [49], the authors utilize
secure computation on encrypted data for deep
packet inspection. However, the existing two
part computation over encrypted data schemes
do not provide the desired property and func-
tionality of QRES.
Searchable encryption: There exist dif-
ferent kinds of searchable encryption schemes
named deterministic [10] and randomized [33,
50]. In [49], Sherry et al. introduced an en-
cryption scheme that achieves both the detec-
tion speed of the deterministic encryption and
the security of the randomized encryption.
Formal analysis: In [8], the authors provide
practical repudiation for autonomous communi-
cation networks by tracing back the selected out-
bound traffic to the predecessor node. They con-
duct a formal security analysis of the OR proto-
col using ProVerif by formalizing anonymity and
no forward traceability as observational equiva-
lence relations, and backward traceability and
no false accusation as trace properties. In [9]
an abstraction of non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs within the applied pi-calculus is pre-
sented. The authors transform their abstraction
into an equivalent formalization that is accessible
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to ProVerif. The authors in [15] study the for-
mal security properties of well-established pro-
tocols for secure file sharing on untrusted stor-
age. The protocol modeling and properties veri-
fication are studied using the automatic protocol
verifier ProVerif.
8 Conclusion
Cloud Service Providers are a lucrative target
because of the amount of data they process. A
disruption of their services due to a hack, can
cause them a terrible financial loss and many
problems for the customers whose data are com-
promised. The inclusion of security implemen-
tations information in the Service Level Agree-
ments is risky, as it would enable malicious enti-
ties to better orchestrate their attacks and easier
discover vulnerabilities. Hence, many providers
do not include them in their SLAs. The SLAs
however, are the agreement between customers
and providers for the services offered, and the
security implementations is an important factor
for choosing a cloud provider.
We tackle this problem with a system called
QRES. Our system enables CSPs to create secu-
rity SLAs and publish them encrypted. With the
help of an intermediate node, customers can find
the cloud provider better matching their security
needs by contrasting their requirements against
the encrypted secSLAs. Our system is utiliz-
ing the QeSe protocol, a searchable encryption
scheme protected by secure two party computa-
tion. The inputs of every party remain private
while the output is only learned by the broker
and consequently the customer.
We implement QRES and formally verify its
security and privacy properties using ProVerif.
In our real word tests, using existing standard-
ized SLAs by the latest industrial standard, the
system proved to be fast for the required use
case. In our measurements, it requires less than
30 seconds to privately search for 50 customer
keywords at a CSP.
QRES is the first step towards providing se-
curity assurance and “transparency” between
cloud customers and CSPs, while at the same
time ensures the confidentiality of the CSPs sen-
sitive information. Moreover, we aim to ex-
tend the system model presented in this paper
by checking whether general functional encryp-
tion [27] schemes can address all the desired se-
curity properties of our model.
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Appendix
Security Definition
A function ν() is negligible in an input parame-
ter k if for every positive polynomial p() and all
large k, ν(k) 6 1/p(k). An Encryption Scheme
ES is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms
(KGen,Enc,Dec) where:
- k←$KGen(1n): It takes as input a security pa-
rameter 1nand outputs a secret key k.
- c←$Enc(pk,m): It takes as input a public key
pk, a plaintext m, and outputs a a ciphertext
c.
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- m←$Dec(sk, c): It takes as input a secret key
sk, a ciphertext c, and outputs a a plaintext
m.
Note that, for symmetric encryption scheme
pk = sk. We denote s←$Sig(sk,m) for signing
m with a secret key; verify the signature using
the public key Vf(pk, s) and recover m.
A Symmetric searchable encryption SSE al-
lows an entity to encrypt data in such a way
that it can later generate search tokens to search
over the encrypted data and find the required
files only. Based on the SE schemes definition
in [33,49], we define an SSE scheme as a tuple of
polynomial time algorithms (KGen, Enc, KeyEnc,
Search) where:
- k←$KGen(1n): It takes as input a security pa-
rameter 1nand outputs a secret key k.
- ct
1
, . . . , ct
n ←$Enc(k, t1, . . . , tn): It takes as in-
put a secret key k and a set of n substrings,
and outputs a set of n encrypted substrings.
- cw←$KeyEnc(k, w): It takes as input a secret
key k and one substring, and outputs an en-
crypted substring.
- d←$ Search(cw, ct1 , . . . , ctn): It searches for the
encrypted substring from ct
1
, . . . , ct
n
which
matches cw. It takes as input n+ 1 encrypted
substrings and outputs the matched encrypted
substring index. If there is no any encrypted
substring matching cw, it outputs ⊥.
Operational semantics
The rules that define the operational semantics
of applied pi-calculus and ProVerif are adapted
from [13]. The identifiers a, b, c, k and sim-
ilar ones range over names, and x , y and z
range over variables. As detailed in [13], set
of symbols is also assumed for constructors and
destructors such that f for a constructor and
g for a destructor. Constructors are used to
build terms. Therefore, the terms are variables,
names, and constructor applications of the form
f(M1, . . . ,Mn).
We use the constructors and destructors de-
fined in [13] as an initial step to represent the
cryptographic operations as depicted in Figure
8. We added other different constructors/de-
structors which are used to define our protocol.
Constructors and destructors can be public or
private. The public ones can be used by the ad-
versary, which is the case when not stated oth-
erwise. The private ones can be used only by
honest participants.
The operational semantics used are presented
in Figure 9. A semantic configuration is a pair
E ,P where the E is a finite set of names and P is a
finite multiset of closed processes. The semantics
of the calculus is defined by a reduction relation
→ on semantic configurations as shown in Figure
9. The process event(M).P executes the event
event(M) and then executes P. The input pro-
cess in(M, x ).P inputs a message, with x bound
to it, on channel M , and executes P. The out-
put process out(M,N).P outputs the message N
on the channel M and then executes P. The nil
process 0 does nothing. The process P|Q is the
parallel composition of P and Q. The replication
!P represents an unbounded number of copies of
P in parallel. (newa)P creates a new name a and
then executes P. The conditional if M = N then
P else Q executes P if M and N reduce to the
same term at runtime; otherwise, it executes Q.
Finally, let x = M in P as syntactic for P{M/x}
which is the process obtained from P by replac-
ing every occurrence of x with M . As usual, we
may omit an else clause when it consists of 0.
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Symmetric enc/dec:
Constructor: encryption of x with the shared
secret key k , senc(x , k)
Destructor: decryption sdec(senc(x , k), k)→ x
Asymmetric enc/dec:
Constructor: encryption of x with the public
key generation from a secret key k , pk(k),
aenc(x , pk(k))
Destructor: decryption
adec(aenc(x , pk(k)), k)→ x
Signatures:
Constructors: signature of x with the secret key
k , sign(x , k)
Destructors: signature verification using he
public key generation from a secret key
k , pk(k), verify(sign(x , k), pk(k))→ x
One-way garbling function:
Constructors: garbling of x with the key
k , garble(x , k)
Evaluation function:
Constructors: evaluation function of garbling of
variables x , y , and z with the key k ,
evaluate(garble(x , k), garble(y , k), garble(z , k))
Commitment:
Constructors: committing x with a fresh nonce
n k , commit(x ,n)
Figure 8: Constructors and destructors
Protocol modelling and proper-
ties verification
In this section we model the Qese protocol de-
picted in Figures 4, then verify the fairness prop-
erty.
− PB(skB, pkB,mB) =!in(c,m).(newb)
event(e1(commit(mB, b))).
out(c, commit(mB, b)).in(c,m
′′).let((xB, xf , xCSP,mx) =
adec(m′′, skB))inifmx = commit(mB, b)then
event(eB(commit(mB, b), xB, xf , xCSP, evaluate(xB, xf , xCSP))).
out(c, evaluate(xB, xf , xCSP))
− PCSP(pkB,mf ,mCSP) = in(c,m′).let((yB = garble(m′, k))|
(yf = garble(mf , k))|(yCSP = garble(mCSP, k)))in
event(e2(m
′, yB, yf , yCSP)).
out(c, (senc((yB, yf , yCSP,m
′), skCSP))
.in(c,m′′′)
ifm′′′ = evaluate(yB, yf , yCSP)then
event(eCSP(m
′, yB, yf , yCSP,m′′′))
− P(newmf )(newmCSP)(newmB)(newskB)letpkB = pkskBin
out(c, pkB).PB(skB, pkB,mB)|PCSP(pkB,mf ,mCSP)
The channel c is public so that the adversary
can send, replay and get any messages sent over
it. We use a single public channel and not two
or more channels because the adversary could
take a message from one channel and relay it
on another channel, thus removing any differ-
ence between the channels. The process P begins
with the creation of the secret and public keys
of B, and the creation of messages mf ,mCSP,mB
The public key is output on channel c to model
that the adversary has it in its initial knowledge.
Then the protocol itself starts: PB represents B,
PCSP represents the CSP. Both principals can
run an unbounded number of sessions, so PB and
PCSP start with replications.
We consider that B first inputs a message con-
taining the encrypted tokens and then starts the
protocol run by choosing a nonce b, and execut-
ing the event e1(commit(mB, b)), where mB is
initially added to the B knowledge. Intuitively,
this event records that B sent Message1 of the
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(Nill) E ,P ∪ {0} → E ,P
(Repl) E ,P ∪ {!P} → E ,P ∪ {P, !P}
(Par) E ,P ∪ {P|Q} → E ,P ∪ {P,Q}
(Par) E ,P ∪ {P|Q} → E ,P ∪ {P,Q}
(New) E ,P ∪ {(newa)P} → E ∪ {a′},P ∪ {P{a′/a}} where a′ /∈ E
(I/O) E ,P ∪ {out(c,M).Q, in(c, x ).P} → E ,P ∪ {Q,P{M/x}}
(Cond1) E ,P ∪ {if M = N then P else Q} → E ,P ∪ {P} if M = N
(Cond2) E ,P ∪ {if M = N then P else Q} → E ,P ∪ {Q} if M 6= N
(Let) E ,P ∪ {let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q} → E ,P ∪ {P{M ′/x}}
if g(M1, . . . ,Mn)→M ′
Figure 9: Operational semantics [14]
protocol. Event e1 is placed before the actual
output of Message1; this is necessary for the
desired correspondences to hold: if event e1 fol-
lowed the output of Message1, we would not be
able to prove that event e1 must have been ex-
ecuted, even though Message1 must have been
sent, because Message1 could be sent without
executing event e1, as stated in [13]. The situa-
tion is similar for events e2, eB and eCSP.
Next, B receives the garbling of CSP’s in-
puts as well as the garbling of the commit-
ted messages encrypted with its public key.
B decrypts the message using its secret key
skB. If decryption succeeds B checks if the
message has the right form using the pattern-
matching construct let((xB, xf , xCSP,= mB) =
adec(m′′, skB))in. Then B executes the event
eB(commit(mB, b), xB, xf , xCSP,
evaluate(xB, xf , xCSP)), to record that it has re-
ceived Message2 and sent Message3 of the pro-
tocol. Finally, B sends the last message of the
protocol evaluate(xB, xf , xCSP).
After sending this message, B executes some
actions needed only for specifying properties
of the protocol. When the received message
mx = commit(mB, b), that is, when the ses-
sion is between B and CSP, B executes the event
eB(commit(mB, b), xB, xf , xCSP,
evaluate(xB, xf , xCSP)), to record that B ended
a session of the protocol, with the participant
(CSP), which is authenticated using the authen-
tication key. B also outputs the evaluation func-
tion output evaluate(xB, xf , xCSP).
The process PCSP proceeds similarly: it ex-
ecutes the protocol, with the additional event
e2(m
′, yB, yf , yCSP) to record that Message1 has
been received and Message2 has been sent by
CSP, in a session with the participant of pub-
lic key pkB and the received message m
′. Af-
ter finishing the protocol itself, when m′′′ =
evaluate(yB, yf , yCSP), that is, when the session
is between B and CSP, PCSP executes the event
eCSP(m
′, yB, yf , yCSP,m′′′), to record that CSP
finished the protocol, and outputs m′′′.
The events will be used in order to for-
malize fairness. For example, we formalize
that, if CSP ends a session of the proto-
col eCSP(m
′, yB, yf , yCSP,m′′′), then (a) B has
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started a session of the protocol by committing
mB with the nonce nB, and (b) CSP outputs the
evaluation function evaluate(yB, yf , yCSP). Fur-
thermore, B ends a session of the protocol, then
(a) CSP has already garbled the B’s committed
input message, and (b) B outputs the evaluation
function evaluate(xB, xf , xCSP).
Next, we formally define the correspondences
in order to verify the fairness property. We prove
correspondences in the form of if an event e has
been executed, then events e1, . . . , em have been
executed. These events may include arguments,
which allows one to relate the values of variables
at the various events. We can prove that each ex-
ecution of e corresponds to a distinct execution
of some events, and that the events have been
executed in a certain order. We assume that the
protocol is executed in the presence of an ad-
versary that can listen to all messages, compute,
and send all messages it has, following the so-
called Dolev-Yao model [24]. Thus, an adversary
can be represented by any process that has a set
of public names Init in its initial knowledge and
that does not contain events.
As presented in system model, the correspon-
dence event eCSP(x1,
x2, x3, x4, x5)  e1(x1) ∧ e2(x1, x2, x3, x4) ∧
eB(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) means that, if the event
eCSP(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) has been executed,
then the events e1(x1), e2(x1, x2, x3, x4) and
eB(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) have been executed, with the
same value of the arguments x1, x2, x3, x4, x5.
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Table 4: Notation and Preliminaries
Term Definition
o Service Level Objective (SLO)
C Customer
B Broker
m Plaintext
c Ciphertext
k Symmetric encryption/decryption key.
pkX Public key of party X.
skX Private key of party X.
certX X.509 certificate of party X.
kauthX Authentication secret generated and sent to party X.
NX ∈ {0, 1}β Random number generated by party X from the set of all binary
strings of length β.
y←$A(x) On input x, algorithm A binds the output to variable y.
m1||m2 Concatenation of m1 and m2.
KGen key generation.
Enc Encryption algorithm
Dec Decryption algorithm
c←$Enc(pk,m) Takes as input a public key pk, a plaintext m, and outputs a
ciphertext c.
m←$Dec(sk, c) Takes as input a secret key sk, a ciphertext c, and outputs a
plaintext m.
sm←$Sig(sk,m) Signs m with a secret key sk, and outputs a signed message sm.
b←$Verify(pk, sm) Verifies the signature using the public key pk and returns 1 if
the signature is valid for the given message and 0 if not.
y←$H(x) Hash function which takes as input x, and responds with a
random outputs y. Ideally, a hash function is defined as a
random oracle that responds with a random output y ∈ Y to
each given input for x ∈ X. Where X is the set of possible
messages, Y is a finite set of possible digests.
t1, . . . , tn The SLA XML file can be split into n substrings. For example,
the substrings generated from Listing 1.1 are: “level3||3” and
“level2||4” (cf., Section 4)
t1CSP1 , . . . , t
n
CSP1
Substrings generated by CSP1 and are named tokens, where n
is the number of tokens
w1C, . . . , w
n
C Substrings generated by the customer C and are named key-
words, where n is the number of keywords
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